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appear, therefore, that no tortious act was committed in Nassau
County.
Foreign manufacturer of defective component part held in
personam under CPLR 302(a)(2).
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,53 the
leading case holding the manufacturer of a defective component
part subject to in personam jurisdiction, has apparently been
adopted in New York. The case of Johnson v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc.5 4 involved a defective speed reducer component manufactured by a Michigan corporation not doing business in New
York. This speed reducer, the price of which was almost $1,800,
was included in an assembled electric scaffold which fell, causing
the deaths of plaintiffs' decedents. The component manufactured
by defendant was purchased by a New Jersey manufacturer for
inclusion in the new glass wall skyscrapers in New York City.
Defendant, Michigan Tool, knew these facts and had occasion to
inspect at least one of these installations of the completed product
in New York. The appellate division, in holding defendant in
personam under CPLR 302(a) (2) stated that the sales and services
amounted to "substantial contacts" thus satisfying due process
regardless of the fact that there was an intermediate sale through
the New Jersey manufacturer. The court further stated that it was
unnecessary to determine whether CPLR 302 (a) (2) would extend
to any component regardless of its cost or function or the ability
of the manufacturer to foresee that the product would be introduced into New York. It was sufficient that defendant's contacts
with New York "were substantial, were indirectly productive of
substantial revenue . . . and the use of its products in this State
was within the ambit of its lively expectations and wishes." 55
Although it appears that Gray has been adopted in New York,
the practitioner is advised to be wary of relying on a Gray situation.
An opposing attorney might well distinguish the instant case from
Gray for several reasons. The defective component in the Gray
case was a valve included in a completed hot water heater. Though
indispensible to the hot water heater, a valve is not a very costly
item. The cost of the speed reducer was very substantial. In Gray
it was not determined how many valves had been introduced into
the state. There was a reasonable inference that other of defendant's
valves were in use in Illinois. In the instant case, a number of
these speed reducers were sold to the New Jersey manufacturer
to be used in New York. As opposed to Gray, there was physical
activity by the defendant in New York in Johnson. Finally, the
5322 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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court in Johnson referred to Section 1.03(a)(4) of the Uniform
Interstate and International Procedure Act. This sectibn provides
for personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary as to a cause of
action arising from tortious injury within the state by an act
or omission outside the state where defendant inter alia "derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed" within the
state. It would appear that the facts of the Gray case do not fall
within this restrictive standard.
CPLR 308(4)-Service as the court directs.
In Goldenthal v. Terry," plaintiff after several unsuccessful
attempts to serve the defendant personally, thereafter made service
pursuant to court order under CPLR 308(4). The court order
which, in effect, permitted
provided for substituted service
plaintiff to mail and affix to the last known residence, as opposed
to CPLR 308(3) which permits mailing to the last known
residence and affixing to the present place of business, abode or
dwelling house. 58 Thus, the court order pursuant to CPLR 308(4)
was more liberal than CPLR 308(3). Defendant moved to dismiss
on the ground that he was not living at the address specified in
the order at the time service was made. The court, nevertheless,
held service valid since defendant failed to sustain the burden of
showing that he had acquired a new residence, and also since he
had failed to show that service was not reasonably calculated
to give him notice of the suit.
CPLR 308(3) has been drafted in such a manner as to
assure that actual notice is given to the defendant.59 A CPLR
308(4) court order must do likewise. If a defendant has acquired
a new residence, mailing and affixing to the old one could hardly
be deemed service reasonably calculated to give notice. Thus, if
defendant had proved that he had acquired a new residence, service
would have been deemed invalid.
It is interesting to note that the plaintiff did not allege that
service was attempted pursuant to CPLR 308(3) or that such
an attempt would have been impracticable. Resort can be made
to CPLR 308(4) when service under subdivisions (1), (2) and
(3) would be impracticable. According to the Revisers, impracticable means futile.60 The practitioner is advised, therefore,
5644 Misc. 2d 851, 255 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
5 CPA §230 required a court order before substituted service could be

utilized.
5

3 Service under CPLR 308(3) may be made by "mailing the summons
to the person to be served at his last known residence and either affixing
the summons to the door of his place of business, dwelling house or usual
place of abode within the state . . ." or delivering the summons to a person
age and discretion at one of these places.
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